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This paper aims to study the effect of AI on firm 
labor structure.  Using a unique panel data of over 1300 
publicly listed companies in China from 2007 to 2018, 
we study the effect of AI on firms’ labor composition 
measured by labor force’s education levels. We further 
compare the effect of AI on firms in the manufacturing 
sector to the effect on firms in the service sector. Our 
analysis generates two major findings. First, the use of 
AI leads to a larger labor demand increase for jobs 
requiring lower education levels than those requiring 
higher education levels. Second, the effect is stronger in 
the service sector than in the manufacturing sector. 
These findings contradict predictions of the “skill-
biased technological change” (SJTB) and U-shaped 
“job polarization” effects proposed in the prior 
literature. We propose that “technology-enabled 
deskilling” effect is driving the effect of AI on labor 
structure.  
1. Introduction 
Artificial intelligence (AI) has become a driving 
force of many technology and business innovations in 
recent years. AI is believed to have multiple and often 
conflicting influence on labor forces. On the one hand, 
it can augment a worker’s skills and hence improve the 
worker’s productivity and thus increase labor demand. 
On the other hand, it can replace certain jobs 
traditionally carried by human workers through 
automation, including some white-collar jobs that 
traditionally require more sophisticated and advanced 
knowledge and skills, a distinction that separates AI 
from previous generations of automation technologies 
(e.g. IT-enabled manufacturing systems) that mostly 
affect simple and repetitive jobs. However, to the best 
of our knowledge, research that empirically analyzes the 
effects of AI on labor force structure at the firm level 
has been scarce [1][2]. 
In this study, we investigate the following research 
questions with an empirical study of a panel data set of 
over 1300 companies in China from 2007 to 2018: 1) 
How does AI affect the labor structure of a firm? 2) How 
does AI’s effect on labor structure in the manufacturing 
industry differ from that in the service industry? As 
noted in Frank et al [3], “lack of empirically informed 
models of key microlevel processes (e.g., skill 
substitution and human-machine complementarity) and 
insufficient understanding of how cognitive 
technologies interact with broader economic dynamics 
and institutional mechanisms” are among “the barriers 
that inhibit scientists from measuring the effects of AI 
and automation on the future of work.” By exploring the 
questions above, this study adds valuable understanding 
about the “microlevel processes” and the “institutional 
mechanisms” discussed herein.  
2. Literature Review 
Following the literature [4], we define AI as 
“intelligent (machine) agents, which are machines, 
software or algorithms that act intelligently by 
recognizing and responding to their environment.”  This 
definition highlights an important characteristic of AI – 
its ability to recognize and respond to its environment.  
This ability allows AI to provide customized or 
individualized responses, while earlier generations of 
automation technologies are more known for 
automation of routinized responses and processes.  The 
distinction of the two different automation technologies 
has great implications for their impact on labor 
demands. 
Several theories and models had been proposed to 
explain the impact of automation technologies on labor 
demand, with the following two theories arguably 
discussed the most: the skill-biased technological 
change (SBTC) and the task-based framework. 
2.1. The Skill-biased Technological Change 
The Skill-biased Technological Change (SBTC) 
was developed based on the finding of a strong 
correlation between the adoption of automation 
technologies and the increased use of better educated 
(e.g. college-educated) labor since the late 1970s 
[5][6][7]. According to this theory, labor forces can be 
divided into two groups based on their skills and how 
automation technologies enhance the capability or 
efficiency of human labor. One important hypothesis is 





that technology change is “skill-biased” [8]. That is, the 
complementary effect technology advancement is 
stronger for jobs requiring higher skills. Thus, the gain 
in productivity of high-skilled and better-educated 
workers due to technology advancement will be larger 
than that of the low-skilled and less educated workers. 
As a result, technological advancements drive 
employers to hire more high-skilled and better-educated 
workers and fewer low-skilled and less-educated 
workers [9]. This period witnessed a demand surge for 
high-skilled IT workers and a supply shortage of such 
workers due to the burst of newly created IT related job 
positions [8]. 
2.2. Task-based Framework (Job Polarization) 
However, later studies found evidence of a U-
shaped job polarization effect in the employment trends 
from the 1980s to 1990s in the U.S, the United 
Kingdom, and Europe [10][11][12]. The term “job 
polarization” refers to the finding of growth in 
employment in both the highest-skilled and paid 
(professional and managerial) and lowest-skilled 
(personal services) and paid occupations, with declining 
employment in the middle of the distribution 
(manufacturing and routine office jobs typically).  
“Skill-biased” framework could not be used to 
explain this phenomenon effectively. Thus, some 
researchers extended the framework of “skill-biased” 
theory and proposed a task-based framework for 
explanation [13][14].  This stream of research suggests 
that IT and other automation technologies is not suitable 
to take on non-routine cognitive tasks that requires 
context-specific analysis, in-person communications or 
creativity. The workers that are the most suitable to take 
on these jobs are typically those with higher education 
and analytical skills. Meanwhile, IT and other 
automation technologies are also not suitable to take on 
the non-routine manual tasks, such as cleaning and 
personal health care. Meanwhile, the strong positive 
impact on overall productivity of IT and other 
automation technologies led to an explosive growth of 
businesses, which in turn lead to more demand for 
labors for non-routine cognitive tasks and non-routine 
manual tasks, thus the U-shape polarization effect.  
3. Hypothesis Development 
3.1 AI and Labor Structure 
With the observation of overall job increases in the 
past two decades, and the advances of new automation 
technologies such as AI and robotics, some researchers 
have started to question whether job polarization, that 
has been found widely exist from the 1980s to 1990s in 
the developed countries, will persist [15][16][17]. For 
the period 2000-2007, Autor [18] and Acemoglu and 
Autor  [19] show that the share of low-skilled jobs 
increased rapidly while the shares of high-skilled or 
middle-skilled jobs did not. This is in contrary to the 
predictions of both the SBTC theory and the “Job 
Polarization” theory.  
In this study, we argue that the effect of AI on labor 
structure can be explained by neither the SBTC theory 
nor the “Job Polarization” theory.  Rather, AI leads to 
technology-enabled deskilling, which benefits 
disproportionally the low-skilled labor force.  
Technology-enabled deskilling was first noted in the 
early days of the industrial revolution.  Reviewing the 
history of industrialization makes it clear that 
technology advances released a strong demand for low-
skilled workers.  In the textile industry, low-skilled 
sewing machine operators took the jobs of the high-
skilled loom workers [20]. In the shipping industry, 
because of the adoption of the steam engines, middle-
skilled professional sailors were replaced by the low-
skilled engine operators [21]. In the manufacturing 
industry, with the prevalence of assembly lines, low-
skilled assembly line workers replaced the craftsmen 
who possess more comprehensive set of skills [22]. 
Technology-enabled deskilling argues that, by taking 
over the part of a job that requires more skills and 
education, automation technologies can lower the skill 
thresholds of workforce for the job, since the rest of the 
job can now be completed by workers with less skills 
and education. 
The surge of high demand for low-skill jobs has 
emerged again in the era of AI, as it did in the era of 
industrialization. For example, it used to be that a taxi 
driver had to master a complex set of knowledge about 
the streets and locations of a city in order to perform 
well in his job. Today, map and navigation applications 
have made it a job essentially that could be handled by 
anyone who knows how to drive. As a result, the high 
skill requirement of the job has been reduced to a low 
skill level. We therefore propose: 
H1: AI has a stronger positive impact on the 
demand for low-skill labors than the demand for high-
skilled labors. 
3.2. Manufacturing versus Service Industries 
Acemoglu and Restrepo [4] argues that AI is an 
“intelligent replacement” technology that can operate by 
recognizing and responding to its environment 
automatically. This feature makes AI capable of dealing 
with non-routine jobs. Non-routine jobs are particularly 
prevalent in the service industry, as all services require 
interactions between a service provider and a customer 
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and the ability to responding to a customer’s individual 
needs is critical. As AI enables such individualized 
response, it reduces the skill requirement for service 
workers. Such reduction in skill requirement could lead 
to a significant increase in labor supply due to the high 
elasticity of labor supply at the lower end [30].  
Bryjolfsson et al. [31] conducted a detailed analysis on 
“suitability for machine learning” (SML) of 18,156 
tasks, and 964 occupations in the O*NET database.  
Four out of the top five high SML occupations are in the 
service industries.  We thus expect the phenomenon of 
“technology-enabled-deskilling” associated with AI to 
affect service industries more than manufacturing 
industries.  
H2: AI has a stronger positive impact on the 
demand for low-skill labors in service sector than in the 
manufacturing sector.  
4. Data and Analysis 
4.1. Data and Measurement 
Our empirical analysis uses a panel data set of 1387 
publicly listed firms in China from 2007 to 2018, a total 
of 12 years. Our original sample has all the 3597 
companies publicly traded in the Chinese Share-A stock 
market and it has 24,265 observations for the time span. 
We then delete a firm if it meets one of the followings: 
1) firms whose stock trading was halted for more than 
half of total trading days in a year; 2) firms with 
abnormal variations (more than 5 times of standard 
deviation); or 3) firms with missing data. The final 
sample we use for the study has 1387 companies and 
4563 observations. The data set is assembled from 
several data sources. 
Labor Structure: The impact of AI on labor 
demand varies by the required skill levels [16][19]. As 
education required for a job is highly related to the 
required information processing and analysis skills for 
the workers, we focus on the impact of automation 
technology on the education structure of the labor force.  
We obtain the educational levels of employees of each 
firm. We further classify them into three categories: 
Category 1 are employees with highest education at the 
PhD level. Category 2 are those with highest education 
at the bachelor’s or master’s level. Category 3 are those 
with highest education below the bachelor’s level. We 
use the log count value of the three types of employees 
to capture the labor structure of the firm. The data comes 
from the RESSET database. 
IT Deployment: For IT deployment, we use a 
company’s annual IT expenditure/investment to 
 
1 See Appendix Table 1. 
measure its deployment of IT, including investment and 
expenses in electronic devices, computers and their 
accessories. This measure is consistent with prior IS 
literatures that investigate the effect of IT on labor 
demand using IT investment or expenditure to measure 
IT inputs [23][24]. The data also comes from the 
RESSET database.  
AI Deployment: For AI deployment, we use the 
proxy AI ratio identified using TALWEM from each 
firm’s annual report as described below. Since AI 
application is still at its early stage, the type of data 
similar to what we use to measure IT deployment is not 
available for the firms in our sample. As a result, the AI 
deployment proxy derived from the firm’s annual report 
is the only feasible option here. Our assumption is that 
the more AI related terms appear in a firm’s annual 
report, the more AI is deployed by the firm [25]. For 
identification, we use a dictionary to count numbers of 
AI terms in the firms’ annual reports. Unlike the 
previous practice of subjective choice of terms used in 
the dictionary, we use a machine learning method (Word 
Embedding) to create our AI dictionary. Word 
Embedding uses neural network to develop models used 
for text search and identification automatically and thus 
is considered as more objective and accurate [26][27]. 
In particular, we use a Chinese Word Embedding model 
developed by Tencent AI Lab. Tencent AI Lab Word 
Embedding Model (TALWEM) includes over 8 million 
Chinese words and idioms with 200 dimensions. The 
training data covers contents available on the Internet, 
news, novels and other text sources as well words and 
idioms used by Wikipedia and Baidu Baike. Song et al. 
[28] provides the details about the algorithm of the 
TALWEM. We use “artificial intelligence” in Chinese 
as the seed word for the TALWEM model to find all the 
words that have a correlation with the word “artificial 
intelligence” above 0.75. A total of 45 such words1 were 
identified according to the model. We then calculate the 
AI deployment ratio using equation (1) below: 
𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑝𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ,
        ,
       ,
1000
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 ,   (1) 
We also use TALWEM to find the ratio of IT terms 
in the firms’ annual reports and use it as a control 
variable in the model. 
𝐼𝑇𝐷𝑝𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ,
        ,
       ,
1000
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 ,   (2) 
We start with the seed word “information system” 
in Chinese, using TALWEM we found 40 words 2 
having a correlation with the word “information system” 
2 See Appendix Table 2. 
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above 0.75. We use these dictionaries to search the 
annual reports of the companies to calculate the proxies 
for IT deployment and AI deployment. 
Control Variables: To control for local labor 
supply with complementary skills (Tambe’s [24]), we 
include the number of local skilled workers measured 
by the annual number of college graduates in the 
province as a control variable in our empirical model. 
Other control variables including firm size, age, 
financial data including financial leverage and capital 
expenditure, and annual stock return for their potential 
influence on labor force structure of the firms. The 
number of annual undergraduate graduates comes from 
the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the financial 
data comes from the RESSET database and other data 
comes from the WIND database. 
Table 1 below show the summary statistics of the 
variables used in our empirical model. (For variable 
definitions see Appendix Table 3) . 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Labor Structure 
ln(PhD) 4,195 0.40 0.97 0.00 6.46 
ln(BMDegrs) 4,195 5.43 2.11 0.00 9.91 
ln(Others) 4,195 7.18 1.42 0.00 11.22 
AI Deployment & IT Deployment 
AIDptRatio 4,194 0.01 0.25 -0.63 2.29 
ln(ITUse) 4,195 17.02 1.55 10.30 22.07 
Control Variables 
ITDptRatio 4,194 0.00 0.07 -0.22 0.62 
ln(BAGrads) 4,195 2.58 0.60 -1.51 3.27 
ln(Assets) 4,195 21.95 1.32 17.67 28.29 
ln(Age) 4,195 8.70 0.34 7.11 9.93 
FinLev 4,195 2.42 2.41 1.01 44.85 
ln(Capex) 4,195 18.34 1.75 7.50 23.72 
Returns 4,195 0.09 0.51 -0.95 3.47 
4.2. Empirical Strategy 
We match the firms in our sample using Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM). Using whether the company 
uses AI, company’s total assets and industry as the 
matching criteria and its total number of employees as 
the dependent variable, with 1:4 ratio, we match the 
firms in the sample. We are able to match 1353 firms in 
our sample. 
To estimate the effects of AI use and IT use on firm 
labor structure, we run a panel data regression model 
with time and firm fixed effects below: 
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 , α
𝛽 𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑝𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 , 𝛽 𝑙𝑛 𝐼𝑇𝐷𝑝𝑡 ,
𝛽 𝐼𝑇𝐷𝑝𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 , 𝜉 𝜂 ∑ 𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 ,
𝜀 ,      (3) 
To assess the differential effects of AI and IT use 
on firms in the manufacturing industries versus those in 
the service industries, we divide the sample into  
subsamples based on the firms’ industry sectors, i.e. we 
divide all firms into the first, second and third sectors 
(agriculture, manufacturing and service sectors).  As 
less than 2% of all public firms are in the agriculture 
sector, we remove them from the analysis.  We run 
individual fixed effect panel data analyses of the 
subsamples based on equation (3) below. 
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 , 𝛼
𝛽 𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑝𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 , 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑀𝑓𝑔 , 𝛽 𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑝𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ,
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑆𝑣𝑐 , 𝛽 ln 𝐼𝑇𝐷𝑝𝑡 , 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑀𝑓𝑔 ,
𝛽 ln 𝐼𝑇𝐷𝑝𝑡 , 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑆𝑣𝑐 , 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑀𝑓𝑔 ,
𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑆𝑣𝑐 , 𝛽 𝐼𝑇𝐷𝑝𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 , 𝜉 𝜂
∑ 𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 , 𝜀 ,  (4) 
5. Results 
Table 2 shows the correlations among the variables. 
Note that correlation between AIDptRatio and 
ln(ITDpt) is relatively insignificant at only 0.05.  
Table 3 shows the results of regression analysis 
based on equation (2). Column 1, 3 and 5 indicate the 
impact of AI and IT deployment on the count of 
employees of different education levels at the firm at 
period T. Column 2, 4, and 6 show the results of the 
same analysis for period T+1. 
We first examine the impact of IT deployment. 
From Column 1,3, and 5, IT deployment is shown to 
have significant positive effects on the labor demands of 
employees across different education levels including 
those with highest education below the bachelor’s, at 
bachelor’s and master’s, and at Ph.D.’s. The finding is 
consistent with the finding in Dixon, Hong and Wu [29] 
- the use of robots results in an overall increase of 
employment using a novel data of Canadian firms. It is 
also consistent with Autor [15][17] which finds overall 
growth of jobs in almost every sector of our economy 
following major technology innovations after a period 
of time.  
We next focus on the impact of AI deployment on 
labor structure. The results in Table 3 show that AI 
deployment has a significant positive effect on the 
firm’s labor demand for employees with highest 
education level below the bachelor’s, but a negative, 
albeit insignificant, effect for employees with highest 
education level above the bachelor’s.  
To compare the effects of AI deployment on the 
labor demand for different education levels, we 
conducted SUR test of the regression coefficients (V) in 
Column 1, 3, and 5 in Table 3 and the results are shown 
in Table 4 (Value 1 and Value 2 in Table 4 are the 
regression coefficients of the corresponding models). 
The default assumption is Value 1 is equal to value 2. 
Based on Panel A in Table 4,  the regression coefficient 
value (0.21) of AIDptRatio  on low education level labor 
(below bachelor’s) amount is significantly larger than 
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those of AIDptRatio on high education level labor 
(Ph.D.) amount (-0.143) and middle education level 
labor (bachelor’s or master’s ) amount (-0.24).  
That is, the deployment of AI has a stronger 
positive impact on the demand for low-skill labors than 
the demand for high-skilled labors. Our finding is 
consistent with Hypothesis 1. Based on Panel B in Table 
4, IT shows positive effects on labor amount across all 
education levels in the firms. And its effect on low 
education level labor demand in the firm seems to be the 
strongest.  
As the required education level for a job represents 
the complexity and difficulty of the part of the job that 
requires “brain work,” our finding indicates that, with 
the use of AI and IT, this part (“brain work”) are 
essentially “outsourced” to AI or IT, resulting in an 
effective separation of the “brain work” and the 
“physical work.” As a result, it lowers the required 
education level for a worker to perform the job, as the 
worker now only needs to take care of the “physical 
work” part of the job. Eventually, this leads to the surge 
of creations of jobs that only deal with the “physical 
work” to a large degree and corresponding labor 
demand for low-education level workers in the firms. 
Table 2. Correlation Analysis 
 AIDptRatio ln(ITDpt) ITDptRatio ln(Assets) ln(BAGrads) ln(Age) FinLev ln(Capex) Returns 
AIDptRatio 1.00         
ln(ITDpt) 0.05 1.00        
ITDptRatio 0.27 0.10 1.00       
ln(Assets) 0.01 0.64 0.00 1.00      
ln(BAGrads) 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.06 1.00     
ln(Age) -0.01 0.12 -0.01 0.22 0.13 1.00    
FinLev -0.01 0.18 -0.02 0.46 -0.02 0.14 1.00   
ln(Capex) 0.01 0.55 0.01 0.60 0.08 -0.01 0.14 1.00  
Returns 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.05 -0.11 -0.18 0.02 -0.02 1.00 
 
Table 3. The Impacts of AI Use and IT Use on Labor 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ln(PhD) ln(PhD) ln(BMDegrs) ln(BMDegrs) ln(Others) ln(Others) 
 T0 T1 T0 T1 T0 T1 
AIDptRatio -0.143 -0.168 -0.240 -0.242 0.210** 0.182* 
 (-1.20) (-1.34) (-1.54) (-1.32) (2.50) (1.92) 
ln(ITDpt) 0.058** 0.072* 0.145*** 0.137*** 0.269*** 0.238*** 
 (2.04) (1.94) (2.95) (2.63) (4.66) (4.83) 
ITDptRatio -0.015 -0.478 0.126 -0.322 -0.163 -0.175 
 (-0.05) (-1.30) (0.17) (-0.42) (-0.51) (-0.64) 
ln(BAGrads) 0.087 0.004 0.051 0.081 -0.279 -0.393* 
 (0.36) (0.02) (0.11) (0.14) (-1.36) (-1.68) 
ln(Assets) 0.195*** 0.188*** 0.587*** 0.623*** 0.356*** 0.375*** 
 (3.54) (2.83) (6.06) (5.60) (4.73) (5.29) 
ln(Age) -0.307 -0.350 -1.322* -1.093 0.569* 0.329 
 (-0.86) (-0.86) (-1.94) (-1.31) (1.84) (1.06) 
FinLev -0.002 -0.023 -0.021 -0.047 -0.004 -0.016 
 (-0.16) (-1.30) (-0.80) (-0.95) (-0.43) (-1.08) 
ln(Capex) 0.007 0.021 0.041 0.057* 0.045*** 0.029** 
 (0.52) (1.20) (1.34) (1.89) (3.03) (2.03) 
Returns 0.052** 0.013 -0.000 0.057 0.022 0.039* 
 (2.14) (0.55) (-0.01) (0.87) (1.10) (1.96) 
Cons -2.516 -2.198 1.230 -1.763 -10.521*** -7.548*** 
 (-0.80) (-0.61) (0.20) (-0.25) (-3.90) (-2.76) 
N 4194 3449 4194 3449 4194 3449 
R-sq 0.0703 0.0785 0.1780 0.1884 0.3289 0.2793 
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
Table 4. Comparisons of the Effects of AI 
Deployment and IT Deployment on Labor 
  Value1 Value2 Chi2 P value 
Panel A: AIDptRatio 
PhD VS BMDegrs -0.143 -0.240 0.55 0.459 
PhD VS Others -0.143 0.210** 13.88 0.000 
BMDegrs VS Others -0.240 0.210** 10.95 0.001 
Panel B: ln(ITUse)  
PhD VS BMDegrs 0.058** 0.145*** 4.04 0.044 
PhD VS Others 0.058** 0.269*** 24.58 0.000 
BMDegrs VS Others 0.145*** 0.269*** 5.42 0.020 
Figure 1 visualizes the impact of AI and IT 
deployment on labor at period T. The horizontal axis 
shows the different education levels required by the jobs 
from the lowest to the highest. The vertical axis shows 
the value of the regression coefficients of AI 
deployment and IT deployment that indicates the impact 
of AI or IT deployment on the labor demand at various 
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education levels. The blue curve shows the impact of the 
IT deployment and the orange curve shows the impact 
of AI deployment. A solid point means the impact is 
statically significant from zero (p<0.1 or less) and the 
hollow point means the impact is not statistically 
significant.  
The results and the figure suggest a few important 
findings. First, IT has a positive effect on labor demand 
for all education levels. This suggests despite the 
potential negative replacement effects, IT, as a maturing 
automation technology, has led to the creations of 
enough new jobs to overcome it for all education levels. 
The new jobs are results of higher productivity. Second, 
the figure indicates that the impact of IT on the demands 
for workers of different education levels follows the 
declining pattern: the lower the education level, the 
stronger the impact. The results for T+1 period are 
consistent, which suggests such trends are not transient. 
This can be attributed the replacement of human “brain 
work” by IT. For the tasks requiring lower education 
level, which is typically routine tasks that can be 
programmed, IT replaces human “brain work” more 
effectively than for tasks requiring higher education 
level. The latter are typically non-routine jobs that 
require more complex knowledge and sophisticated 
cognitive or analytic skills. Consequently, IT lowers the 
level of education required for human labor to complete 
the rest of the task more effectively and thus stimulates 
more demand for such low education labors. 
 
Figure 1. Impact on Labor Structure  
Meanwhile, AI shows a significant positive impact 
only for demand of low education level labor. AI shares 
much similarity to IT as an automaton technology, 
which explains their similar positive effects on labor 
demand for the low-education level through the 
replacement effect of “brain work”. As for jobs 
requiring middle and high-level educations, AI shows 
no significant effect. The major differences between IT 
and AI is AI’s ability to perform non-routine cognitive 
tasks.  As such, AI is more capable of replacing human 
for jobs requiring complex cognitive skills, creativity 
and decision making than IT. This suggests AI has 
stronger replacement effect for human labors for jobs 
requiring higher education levels and consequently a 
stronger negative effect on demand for labor with higher 
education level. We also note that AI is not as mature as 
IT in its applications. IT as a mature automation 
technology has stimulated significant amount of new 
products, services and businesses and consequently 
creations of a wide spectrum of jobs requiring different 
levels of skills and education. The resulted new jobs are 
more than enough to compensate the jobs loss due to 
IT’s replacing human. AI, on the other hand, is just at its 
dawn of applications. In fact, so far the most significant 
commercial applications of AI in terms of scales have 
focused on the jobs requiring low education levels (e.g. 
AI customer service agents). AI’s applications for tasks 
requiring middle or high education are yet to reach the 
depth, width and scale. Consequently, AI are yet to 
stimulate sufficient new services, products and 
businesses that lead to new jobs requiring middle or 
high-level educations as IT.  To summarize, on the one 
hand, AI is more powerful to replace human for jobs 
requiring middle and high education than IT. On the 
other hand, AI is currently less effective to stimulate 
new jobs requiring middle and high education than IT 
due to less mature applications. These two mechanisms 
then lead to the overall less positive effects of AI on the 
demands for workers with middle or high education. 
However, as AI matures in its applications, we could 
expect AI to demonstrate a stronger positive effect in 
stimulating new jobs requiring middle and high 
education. At that point, the pattern might change. 
We next explore whether and how the impact of AI 
and IT on labor structure of a firm is related to the sector 
it belongs to. Table 5 demonstrates the summary 
statistics of AI deployment, IT deployment and counts 
of employees of the three different education levels at 
firms in manufacturing and service sectors. The variable 
“AIDptRatio Raw” is the ratio of AI terms in the firm’s 
annual report before adjusted with the industry average. 
Based on “AIDptRatio Raw”, AI deployment is lower 
in the manufacturing sector and higher in the service 
sector.  
Table 5 Summary Statistics of the 
Manufacturing and Service Sectors 
Variable Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Manufacturing Sectors - IndMfg 
AIDptRatio 2,862 0.02 0.26 -0.22 2.29 
AIDptRatio  
Raw 
2,862 0.13 0.27 0.00 2.36 
ln(ITUse) 2,863 16.97 1.47 11.66 22.05 
ln(PhD) 2,863 0.38 0.94 0.00 6.46 
ln(BMDegrs) 2,863 5.39 2.03 0.00 9.85 
ln(Others) 2,863 7.38 1.24 0.00 11.22 
Service Sectors - IndSvc 
AIDptRatio 1,275 0.01 0.23 -0.63 1.67 
AIDptRatio  
Raw 
1,275 0.16 0.30 0.00 1.94 
ln(ITUse) 1,275 17.16 1.72 10.30 22.07 
ln(PhD) 1,275 0.44 1.04 0.00 6.15 
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ln(BMDegrs) 1,275 5.58 2.25 0.00 9.91 
ln(Others) 1,275 6.72 1.67 0.00 11.19 
Table 6 shows the results of the regression model in 
equation (3). Column 1, 3, and 5 indicate the effect of 
AI deployment and IT deployment on the count of firm 
employees of different education levels in period T. 
Column 2, 4 and 6 indicate these effects in period T+1. 
Figure 2 shows how AI and IT influence labor demand 
in manufacturing and service sectors.  
For the manufacturing sector, IT deployment has a 
similar pattern of impact on labor demand for different 
education levels consistent to that of the full sample 
analysis: (1) positive effects for all types of labor 
demands and (2) that the less education required, the 
stronger the positive effects. However, AI deployment 
has significant negative impact on demand for labors 
requiring middle and high-level education in 
manufacturing sector.  The finding suggests that AI has 
a more powerful replacement effect for human labors 
for jobs requiring higher educations in manufacturing. 
In sectors like manufacturing where robotics technology 
is more suitable and has more mature and wider 
applications, AI has gained more power in replacing 
human labors. This result also reminds us that, in order 
for AI to be more effective to automate the “brain work” 
part of a job task, application and advancement in 
robotics that automates the “physical work” part is 
necessary. 
Table 6 The Impact of AI and IT in Manufacturing and Service Sectors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ln(PhD) ln(PhD) ln(BMDegrs) ln(BMDegrs) ln(Others) ln(Others) 
  T0 T1 T0 T1 T0 T1 
AIDptRatio × IndMfg -0.267* -0.227 -0.300* -0.308 0.107 0.193* 
 (-1.74) (-1.40) (-1.81) (-1.53) (1.27) (1.91) 
AIDptRatio × IndSvc 0.045 -0.179 0.161 0.297 0.515*** 0.353* 
 (0.23) (-0.81) (0.43) (0.65) (2.98) (1.95) 
ln(ITDpt) × IndMfg 0.087** 0.088* 0.194*** 0.155** 0.284*** 0.225*** 
 (2.37) (1.89) (2.96) (2.40) (4.48) (4.16) 
ln(ITDpt) × IndSvc 0.011 0.040 0.089 0.116* 0.252*** 0.268*** 
 (0.30) (1.05) (1.39) (1.67) (3.66) (4.44) 
IndMfg -0.805 -2.201 -19.427** -19.686** -4.683*** -5.042*** 
 (-0.49) (-1.18) (-2.03) (-2.36) (-3.38) (-3.07) 
IndSvc 0.222 -1.676 -17.148* -18.513** -4.044*** -5.460*** 
 (0.14) (-0.90) (-1.79) (-2.22) (-2.66) (-3.19) 
ITDptRatio -0.203 -0.705* 0.474 0.046 -0.101 0.062 
 (-0.67) (-1.94) (0.60) (0.05) (-0.30) (0.23) 
ln(BAGrads) 0.084 0.010 -0.044 -0.023 -0.311 -0.427* 
 (0.35) (0.04) (-0.10) (-0.04) (-1.52) (-1.83) 
ln(Assets) 0.202*** 0.191*** 0.578*** 0.621*** 0.357*** 0.375*** 
 (3.60) (2.84) (5.94) (5.51) (4.72) (5.32) 
ln(Age) -0.361 -0.376 -1.118* -0.784 0.612** 0.451 
 (-1.01) (-0.91) (-1.79) (-1.02) (1.97) (1.47) 
FinLev -0.001 -0.024 -0.018 -0.044 -0.003 -0.015 
 (-0.08) (-1.39) (-0.69) (-0.89) (-0.31) (-1.02) 
ln(Capex) 0.007 0.021 0.040 0.055* 0.044*** 0.027* 
 (0.50) (1.24) (1.31) (1.83) (2.94) (1.88) 
Returns 0.053** 0.013 0.010 0.070 0.025 0.041** 
 (2.20) (0.58) (0.17) (1.07) (1.23) (2.07) 
Cons -1.779 -0.041 18.343 15.102 -6.412** -3.329 
 (-0.59) (-0.01) (1.58) (1.37) (-2.36) (-1.18) 
N 4194 3449 4194 3449 4194 3449 
R-sq 0.0752 0.0832 0.1857 0.1966 0.3340 0.2887 
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
 
  
Manufacturing Sector Service Sector 
Figure 2. Labor Demand Growth Rate in Manufacturing and Service Sectors 
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In the service sector, both AI deployment and IT 
deployment have positive effects only for jobs requiring 
low education while their effects on jobs requiring 
middle or high-level education are not statistically 
significant. This finding suggests that, for service sector 
where non-routine jobs are typically an integral part of 
the service and the middle and high level jobs often 
require inter-person communication and cognitive skills 
(e.g. education and health care) or creativity, IT has a 
less prominent roles to play despite its mature 
applications. Also, if we compare the effects of AI or IT 
in manufacturing and service sectors, AI has a stronger 
impact in the service sector than in the manufacturing 
sector while IT has a similar level of impact for both the 
service and the manufacturing sectors. Our finding is 
consistent with Hypothesis 2, which notes that AI is 
especially powerful for non-routine jobs involving 
personalization and customization, which makes AI 
especially influential in the service sector than in the 
manufacturing sectors. where jobs are more likely to 
involve routine tasks. 
6. Summary and Discussion 
Since the inception of industrialization, a major 
concern of the society is whether automation will 
deprive humans of jobs and reduce the share of human 
labor in the whole production process of our society. 
Multiple theories offered competing explanations and 
predictions on this issue.   
Our empirical study reported in this paper lends 
support to the “technology-enabled deskilling” effect 
theory – i.e. AI reduces the education level requirement 
for certain jobs and accordingly it shows a strong 
positive effect on jobs requires low education levels 
(below college). As AI is able to replace human for the 
relatively complex cognitive and analytic tasks, it 
essentially lowered the job entry requirement. This 
surprising strong complimentary effect of AI on labor 
demand for low-skill workers could have far-reaching 
implications for innovative business models and labor 
market landscape.  Moreover, our study shows this 
effect is stronger in the service sector than in the 
manufacturing sector. We attribute this to the fact that 
in service sector there are more non-routine jobs than in 
manufacturing sectors. When AI overtakes the part of a 
non-routine job that requires sophisticated cognitive or 
analytic skills, it separates the high-skill part of the job 
to the low-skill part and increase the demand for low-
skill workers. It does so more in the service sector than 
in the manufacturing sector. Finally, the study shows 
although AI is built on the traditional IT infrastructure, 
it differs from IT in their effects on labor demand in an 
organization in notable ways. This is due to their 
different stages in terms maturity of the technology and 
their applications and the unprecedented capacity of AI 
to overtake jobs requesting sophisticates cognitive and 
analytic skills.  
This study has quite some limitations that we hope 
to explore further in our future research. One of such 
limitations is our measure of AI deployment, which is 
the count of AI related terms in the firms’ annual reports. 
We do not observe the actual application of AI in firms.  
Recent studies on task-technology fit (TTF) and 
affordance theory finds that AI is better fit for certain 
tasks than others.  As such, a micro level analysis of the 
application of AI at the task level will be fruitful in 
better understanding the underlying mechanism of the 
effect of AI labor demand.  The second limitation of this 
study is the challenge in establishing causality.  While 
we try to establish (Granger) causality by analyzing 
response variables in the t+1 period, the relationships 
identified are ultimately associations rather than causal 
effects. There may also exist potential confounders that 
we did not control.   
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8. Appendix 
Appendix Table 1. Dictionary of AI terms 
AI terms in Chinese AI terms in English 
人工智能 Artificial Intelligence 
AI AI 
AI+ AI+ 
AI+医疗 AI+ Medical Care 
AI 技术 AI Technology 
AI 领域 AI Field 
AI 人工智能 Artificial Intelligence 
AI 时代 AI Age 
AI 芯片 AI Chip 
大数据 Big Data 
大数据和云计算 Big Data and Cloud Computing 
大数据与人工智能 Big Data and Artificial Intelligence 
发展人工智能 Developing artificial intelligence 
机器人和人工智能 Robot and Artificial Intelligence 
机器人技术 Robotics 
机器学习 Machine Learning 
机器智能 Machine Intelligence 
计算机视觉 Computer Vision 
人工智能 AI Artificial Intelligence 
人工智能产业 Artificial Intelligence Industry 
人工智能的发展 Development of Artificial Intelligence 
人工智能的未来 The future of Artificial Intelligence 
人工智能和机器学习 
Artificial Intelligence and Machine 
Learning 
人工智能化 Artificial Intelligence 
人工智能机器 Artificial Intelligence Machine 
人工智能机器人 Artificial Intelligence Robot 
人工智能技术 Artificial Intelligence Technology 
人工智能领域 Artificial Intelligence Field 
人工智能深度学习 
Artificial Intelligence and Deep 
Learning 
人工智能时代 Artificial Intelligence Age 
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人工智能算法 Artificial Intelligence Algorithm 
人工智能芯片 Artificial Intelligence Chip 
人工智能研发 
Research and Development of Artificial 
Intelligence 
人工智能应用 Artificial Intelligence Application 
认知计算 Cognitive Computation 
认知技术 Cognitive Technology 
深度学习 Deep Learning 
深度学习算法 Deep Learning Algorithm 
图像识别 Pattern Recognition 
物联网 Internet of Things 
新兴科技 Emerging Technology 
云计算 Cloud Computing 
智能 Intelligence 
智能机器 Intelligent Machine 
智能技术 Intelligent Technology 
 
Appendix Table 2. Dictionary of IT terms 
IT terms in Chinese IT terms in English 
信息系统 Information System 
服务系统 Service System 
管理平台 Management Platform 
管理系统 Management System 
管理信息系统 Management Information System 
平台系统 Platform System 
企业信息系统 Enterprise Information System 
软件系统 Software System 
实现信息 Realization of information 
数据共享 Data Sharing 
数据互联互通 Interconnection in Data 
数据集成 Data Integration 
数据系统 Data System 
数据信息 Data Information 
统一平台 Integrated Platform 
网络系统 Network System 
网络信息系统 Network Information System 
系统平台 System Platform 
系统数据 System Data 
相关系统 Related System 
信息管理 Information Management 
信息管理平台 Information Management Platform 
信息管理系统 Information Management System 
信息互联互通 Interconnection in Information 
信息化管理 Informatization Management 
信息化管理系统 Informatization Management System 
信息化平台 Informatization Platform 
信息化系统 Informatization System 
信息数据 Information Data 
信息网络系统 Information Network System 
信息系统建设 Information System Construction 
信息系统平台 Information System Platform 
业务管理系统 Operation Management System 
业务系统 Operation System 
业务信息系统 Operating Information System 
业务应用系统 Business Application System 
应用系统 Application System 
云平台 Cloud Platform 
综合管理系统 Comprehensive Management System 
综合信息系统 Integrated Information System 
Appendix Table 3. Description of Key 
Measures and Data Sources 
Measure Description 
Labor Structure 
ln(PhD) Number of employees with doctor degree and in 
natural logarithm. 
ln(BMDegrs) Number of employees with bachelor's and 
master's as the highest degree in natural logarithm. 
ln(Others) Number of employees whose highest education is 
high school, vacation school or lower in natural 
logarithm. 
AI Deployment & IT Deployment 
AIDptRatio AI deployment proxy: the ratio of AI related terms 




The ratio of AI terms in the firm’s annual report 
before adjusted with the industry average. 
ln(ITDpt) IT deployment proxy, using the firm’s IT related 
fixed assets, including electronic equipment and 
computers and auxiliary equipment, in natural 
logarithm. 
Control Variables 
ITDptRatio IT deployment proxy: the ratio of IT related terms 
in the firm’s annual report adjusted with industry 
average. 
ln(BAGrads) Number of undergraduate graduates in each 
province (x 10,000) in natural logarithm. 
ln(Assets) Total assets in natural logarithm. 
ln(Age) The age of listed firms (days) in natural logarithm. 
FinLev Financial Leverage, using equity multiplier as a 
proxy indicator, calculated by dividing the ending 
balance of total assets by the ending balance of 
owner's equity. 
ln(Capex) Capital expenditures: cash paid for the purchase 
and construction of fixed assets, intangible assets 
and other long-term assets in a year. 
Returns The annual returns of individual stocks adjusted 
by market returns. 
Sector Structure 
IndMfg The second sectors: manufacturing sector. 
IndSvc The third sector: service sector. 
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